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The new pension system launched in Hungary in 1998 is epoch-making for having introduced a 
mandatory private pension scheme (MPPS). However, the political decision-making on pension reform 
and the scheme operations have been greatly influenced by conflicts of interests among ministries, 
political conflicts between parties, and the presence of special interest groups, including trade unions 
and financial institutions. This situation may have had a certain negative influence on the legal 
framework of the MPPS and on the management performance of private pension funds. In order for the 
MPPS to be sustainable in the future and to make insurance beneficiary profits a top priority, the 
corporate governance reform of pension funds and reinforcement of the monitoring system over them, 
and political neutralization of the public pension system are necessary. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Mandatory Private Pension Scheme (MPPS),
1 which puts the operation of public pensions in 
the hands of the private sector, and its organizational entity, the Private Pension Funds (PPFs), are 
the core of pension reform in Hungary. In 1998, the central government carried out a transition to 
the so-called Three-Pillar Pension System. A smooth development of the MPPS, which constitutes 
the second pillar, and securing sound management practices of fund bodies are fundamental 
elements to guide the 1998 pension reform to success as well as very significant ones in terms of 
social policy to overcome the uneasiness citizens feel about their future. Such anxiety arises from 
the opaqueness of the future triggered by the transition to a market economy and from the 
worsening of problems related to the declining birthrate and the aging population (Szeman 2001; 
Sato 2003; Gál and Tarcali 2003; Hablicsek 2004). Because Hungary’s endeavor serves as a pilot 
case for other Central and Eastern European countries, which also need drastic pension reforms, it 
has a hidden potential to highly influence pension reform debates in the region. Thus, an objective 
of this paper was to describe how pension reform in Hungary occurred with special references to 
MPPS and PPFs, which have become a touchstone for the pension system in Hungary and also in 
Central and Eastern Europe.
2  The paper is organized as follows: the next section is a description of 
the political circumstances before and after the 1998 pension reform. The third section is a review 
of the institutional framework of the second pillar of the new pension system. The fourth 
illuminates the development process and the industrial structure of the mandatory private pension 
market. In the fifth, the performance of the pension funds is quantitatively examined. Finally, the 
conclusion presents a summary of the results and the major implications of the findings. 
 
2. POLITICS OF THE 1998 PENSION REFORM 
The most outstanding feature of the pension reform in 1998 is that MPPS has been introduced as 
the  “second pillar,” after the state pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security pension scheme. The 
process leading up to the 1998 pension reform was lengthy and filled with complicated political 
 
1 In Hungarian, it is refered to as Kötelező magánnyugdíjrendszer. The reason that it is desribed as 
“mandatory” is simply that, as opposed to the third pillar (the voluntary pension scheme), it entails 
statutory membership. See Matits (2004a) for details. 
2 The public pension scheme in Hungary is composed of (1) an old-age pension; (2) a disability 
pension; (3) a widow’s pension; (4) an orphan’s allowance; and (5) a parent’s pension. However, in 
this paper, only the old-age pension is addressed. As for the terms of the old-age pension scheme, only 
some parts of it are considered since the focus of this study is to investigate the flaws in the MPPS 
and PPFs. For an outline and operating situation of the old-age pension as a whole, see Sato (2000), 
Augsztinovics et al. (2002), and the East-West Management Institute (2003).  2
debates. Since then, the new pension system has largely been affected by the political conflict 
between the ruling and the opposition parties. It also had a manifest influence on MPPS itself.
3 
The Socialist Party, which won the 1994 parliamentary election, formed a coalition 
government (the Horn Cabinet) with the Alliance of Free Democrats, and, in the following year, 
undertook an economic stabilization policy known as the “Bokros Package,” which was named 
after the then Minister of Finance. The Horn administration made its intention clear to drastically 
revise the pension system as part of this policy package aimed at sharply reducing public finance. 
This resulted in an intense confrontation over a special feature of the reform, namely the MPPS, 
between the Ministry of Finance, which strongly argued for the introduction of the MPPS, and the 
Ministry of Welfare, which first of all requested improvement of the existing state PAYG scheme, 
together with the Pension Insurance Fund Self-governing Body (PIF), which is the operative body 
of the state pension. 
The reform proposal of the Ministry of Finance was prepared by a working group for pension 
reform established in the beginning of 1995. At first, Finance Minister Lajos Bokros and his 
powerful advisor and famous banker Adam Gere asserted, as the fundamental policy of the reform, 
the phase-out of the PAYG scheme and its complete replacement with MPPS. However, such an 
excessively radical policy did not receive sufficient support within the Ministry and was renounced 
in an early stage of the review.
4  Instead, the working group suggested a more realistic reform plan 
in which both the PAYG and the MPPS schemes would work in harmony. This proposal strongly 
reflected the intention of the World Bank at the time, namely, that it was very eager to implement 
“the Three-pillar Pension System” in post-socialist countries.
5 
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Welfare sought the cooperation of German pension advisors and 
set forth an argument opposing the pension reform draft proposed by the Ministry of Finance. The 
PIF, which was under the supervision of the National Association of Hungarian Trade Unions 
(MSZOSZ), entered the debate between the ministries in favor of the Ministry of Welfare, as the 
 
3 Furthermore, the arguments presented in this paper are based on the literature quoted and on survey 
interviews conducted by the authors in March 2003 and March 2004 among Hungarian researchers 
and specialists, to whom we expressed our gratitude earlier. 
According to Müller (1999, 73-74), the blueprint of Minister Bokros’s initial reform plan was based on 
the old-age pension privatization policy implemented by the Chilean government. However, due to 
the negative attitude of the Hungarian people toward the Pinochet dictatorship and the developing 
Latin America as a whole, reference to the Latin-American-type pension reform ceased afterwards. 
5 According to our interview with Tibor Párniczky, former vice-president of the Supervisory Authority 
of Pension Funds, who served as chairman of that working group, a member of the group and the 
World Bank’s Budapest office made frequent contacts in the process of preparing the draft proposal of 
the Finance Ministry. In fact, as Gedeon (2001) states, international organizations had significant 
influence on the policy decision-making process in Hungary, including the pension reform.  3
intention of the unions was to retain strong control of the public pension system (Orenstein 2000; 
Rein 2002). While the Ministry of Welfare referred to the German pension system and proposed a 
system with two features, namely a state PAYG pension proportional to income and a voluntary 
pension fund, the PIF demanded to tune up the basic pension based on tax to maintain and 
complement the existing state PAYG scheme as well as the voluntary savings-type pension. In other 
words, the Ministry of Welfare and the PIF were convinced that “the problems of the Hungarian 
Pension Reform could be solved without a forced paradigm shift in the approach to the basic social 
role of obligatory pension insurance” (Bod 1995, 174). As a result, bureaucratic debate on the 
reform was actually deadlocked until the Minister of Finance Bokros resigned in February 1996.   
The controversy was resolved by a compromise prompted by the new Finance Minister, Péter 
Medgyessy. The Horn cabinet valued its relationship with the West and viewed the agreement 
among the parties involved with the reform as an impending problem in order to accomplish an 
official commitment with the IMF, which was to pave the way for the implementation of the 
pension reform by the end of 1996. In addition, it was clear that the approaching parliamentary 
elections were being taken into account by the central government. Thus, Minister Medgyessy, 
keeping an eye on the political calendar, initiated a persuasive plot that targeted high-ranking 
officials. In April 1996, thanks to his adroitness, an inter-ministerial committee was created, and the 
vice-ministers of finance and welfare were joint chairmen. At this point, the Ministry of Welfare 
had accepted the basic policy in the Ministry of Finance’s reform proposal, which was laid out by 
the inter-ministerial committee for pension reform, and considerably softened its attitude by giving 
in to the pressure from the cabinet. Therefore, the inter-ministerial committee, right after beginning 
the operation, was able to start preparing for a reform proposal of social insurance-related 
legislation and MPPS-related bills on the premise that the Three-Pillar Pension System would be 
introduced.
6 
Simultaneously, the governmental pension reform proposal was discussed by the Interest 
Reconciliation Council, which was made up of representatives from the central government, trade 
unions, and business and academic circles.
7  The council’s ostensible role was to shape the pension 
reform for the national debate; however, its true objective was presumably to reflect the interests of 
 
6 Furthermore, as a result of consultation with the inter-ministerial committee, it was decided that the 
Ministry of Welfare would continue to have jurisdiction over the PAYG scheme after the pension 
reform. The Ministry of Welfare dealt with a reform proposal of social insurance-related legislation, 
while the MPPS and pension fund-related bills were allotted to the Ministry of Finance and the 
Supervisory Authority of Pension Funds. 
7 The Interest Reconciliation Council is a standing government advisory board established during the 
Antall administration (1990 to 1993) and is convened by the prime minister or high-ranking 
government officials out of political necessity.  4
the MSZOSZ and the PIF. In fact, the Council was set up as a result of strong lobbying activity 
against Socialist parliamentarians by these two organizations demanding to ease the burden of 
employees and to secure the authority of trade unions. 
The process of reform discussions and political compromising at the inter-ministerial 
committee and the Interest Reconciliation Council are summarized in the text that follows. With the 
introduction of the Three Pillar Pension System, the reform draft by the Ministry of Finance 
stipulated that (1) the total pension insurance contribution of the employer and employee would be 
25 % of gross wages; (2) of this amount, 15 % of the employer contribution would go to the state 
PAYG scheme; (3) 10 % of the employee contribution would go to the MPPS; and (4) all insured 
under 40 must join both the PAYG scheme and MPPS (with no changes for those aged 40 and 
above). Meanwhile, the Ministry of Welfare proposed that (1) the total pension insurance 
contribution would be 28 %; (2) 18 % of that amount would be employer contributions earmarked 
for the PAYG scheme; and (3) the remaining 10 % of the employee contributions would go to the 
MPPS. However, the MSZOSZ protested against an increase in the employee share, and, therefore, 
the initial contribution by workers to the second pillar was reduced to 6 % (to be raised to 8 % two 
years later). Moreover, the MSZOSZ also made the following compromises: (1) the establishment 
of a Guarantee Fund of pension funds (discussed in the next section); (2) the continuation of PIF 
management by the MSZOSZ; and (3) the grant of authority to the trade union for the 
establishment of PPFs; and (4) the postponement of disability pension reform.
8 
The new pension insurance rate legislated after going through the above process and 
deliberations in Parliament was set at 24 % of the employer contribution and 7 % of the employee 
contribution (Table 1).
9  The resulting total insurance rate was 31 %, 6 % higher than that proposed 
by the Ministry of Finance. In other words, although the Finance Ministry did actualize the Three 
Pillar Pension System, it did not succeed in alleviating the burden imposed on the corporate sector. 
In addition, and contrary to the Finance Ministry’s intentions, a sharp decrease in the insurance rate 
from 10 % to 6 % on the contribution to MPPS was adopted, as well as switching to a choice 
system enabling employees, except for the new entrants into the labor market, to opt for (1) the 
PAYG scheme exclusively or (2) both the PAYG scheme and MPPS. The foregoing points convey 
 
8 Despite these facts, however, our interview survey revealed that many Hungarian researchers share a 
common view that the MSZOSZ did not have enough influence over the 1998 reform as a whole. 
9 However, this measure was effective for a specified period in 1998 to reduce the employer 
contributions by one percent annually to 22 % by 2000, while, at the same time, increasing the 
employee contributions by one percent annually to 9 % by 2000. During parliamentary deliberations, 
the following points were resolved: (1) the abolition of gender distinction in the pension system; (2) a 
phased increase in the pension eligibility age from 60 for men and 55 for women to 62 for both sexes; 
and (3) postponing the introduction of a Swiss style of indexing for two years.  5
the systematic inertia, a legacy of socialist Hungary, which was mockingly described as “a 
premature welfare state” by Kornai (1997). 
In addition, the fact that private financial institutions and influential investors were deeply 
involved in the introduction of the MPPS cannot be overlooked. In 1993, the present third pillar or 
Voluntary Pension Funds (VPFs) were established at once, and main entrants to this new financial 
market were prominent foreign and domestic banks and insurance companies. For financial 
institutions with experience establishing VPFs, the MPPS is a good business opportunity with low 
risk and great future perspectives. Therefore, it was only natural that these financial institutions 
would act as an interest group supporting the introduction of the MPPS (Rein 2002, 216). Indeed, 
since 1998, the largest VPFs instantly achieved business development in the mandatory private 
pension market.  Furthermore, the inter-ministerial committee chose famous investor Csaba 
Lantos as chief of a working party entrusted with the creation of PPF asset investment rules 
(Orenstein 2000, 38). This case and the preceding one involving Adam Gere are just two examples, 
but the fact that private financial institutions and investors directly or indirectly participated in the 
policy decision-making process of introducing the MPPS had a certain influence on the 
organizational structure and management performance of pension PPFs, as discussed later. 
On January 1, 1998, the Three-pillar Pension System was introduced. It is noteworthy that the 
first (even partial) pension privatization in Central and Eastern Europe was implemented by a 
Socialist government. As Müller (2004, 3) pointed out, this measure could be a resolute signal 
from the Hungarian policymakers to struggle with outstanding structural reforms. 
The new pension system, however, did not take root easily. The Socialist Party, contrary to the 
expectations of the majority, only won 134 seats in the parliamentary elections of May 1998, 
losing against the Young Democrats, who won 148 seats. As a result, a coalition government was 
formed comprising the Young Democrats, the Independent Smallholders’, Land Workers’ and 
Civic Party, and the Hungarian Democratic Forum. Before the parliamentary elections, the Young 
Democrats assumed a wait-and-see attitude, which suggested that they did not support radical 
reform but were unwilling to protest against the government. However, as soon as they assumed 
power, the coalition government headed by Viktor Orban altered the new pension system. The 
main changes were (1) a phased decrease in the employer insurance contribution; (2) a delay of 
the one-percent increase in the contribution from the employee, which was originally set for 2000; 
and (3) the abolishment of the formal and real authorities over the PIF delegated to the MSZOSZ 
by the placement of the PIF under direct government control. It is clear that the aim of such 
political acts by the Young Democrats was to gain support from industry and labor and to split the 
pro-socialist trade unions, including the MSZOSZ. 
In the 2002 April elections, the Young Democrats won against the Socialist Party by a narrow  6
margin (188 seats to 178 seats), but the Socialist Party joined hands with the Alliance of Free 
Democrats, which gained 20 seats. As a result, the Young Democrats lost power. Due to this power 
shift, the new pension system was partly modified once again. First, in 2002, compulsory entry into 
the MPPS for newcomers to the labor market was abolished, but, in 2003, it was again mandatory.   
In the same year, employee pension insurance was raised from 8.0 % to 8.5 %, and the employee 
reserve pension insurance rate for those who chose the second pillar went up from 6.0 % to 7.0 %.   
It is truly unfortunate for the Hungarian citizens that the institutional framework of pension 
schemes and insurance rates, which, in reality, should be decided with a view to the future, were 
influenced by the dynamics of a political takeover.     
As observed, the new pension system introduced in 1998 has continually been subject to 
political whims and remains so today. The possibility that this negative influence is extending to the 
operations of the MPPS cannot be denied. With this in mind, the next section provides an 
examination of the institutional framework of the MPPS and PPFs. 
 
3. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE MANDATORY PRIVATE 
PENSION SCHEME AND THE PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS 
 
The legislation regulating the basic framework of the MPPS and the organizational and operational 
form of PPFs has a two-layered structure, namely republican acts and governmental decrees. 
According to a report of the Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) (2001) and the East-West 
Management Institute (2003), the four main acts providing the basic structure of the second pillar 
are noted as follows: 
(1)  Act LXXX of 1997 on Persons Entitled to Social Security Benefits and Private Pension, as well 
as the Coverage of these Services; 
(2)  Act LXXXI of 1997 on the Social Insurance Pension; 
(3)  Act LXXXII of 1997 on Private Pension and Private Pension Funds; 
(4)  Act LXXXIV of 1997 on Amendments to Act III of 1993 on Social Administration and Social 
Benefits. 
On the other hand, governmental decrees contain detailed rules on insurance premium 
administrative affairs and investment activities of PPFs, as well as on organizational/operational 
regulations of the Guarantee Fund. This layer includes eight decrees, such as the Governmental 
Decree No. 168/1997 on the Enforcement of Act LXXXI and No. 169/1997 on the Organizational 
and Operational Rules of the Guarantee Fund.
10  Besides these laws and decrees, PPF activities are 
 
10  Other ordinances are (1) Governmental Decree No. 170/1997 on the Actuarial and Financial Planning 
Rules Related to the Activities of Private Pension Funds, as well as on Reserving Requirements; (2)  7
controlled by administrative orders from the Ministry of Finance and the FSA. Based on these 
official documents and Augusztinovits et al. (2002, 40-45), the institutional framework of the 
newly introduced second pension pillar can be summarized as follows: 
According to Act LXXXII of 1997, PPFs are established as nonprofit organizations. Those 
who have the right to establish PPFs are employers as corporate bodies, the Chamber of Commerce, 
trade unions, and VPFs. These entitled bodies are allowed to establish a fund in mutual 
cooperation. 
Legally, PPFs are owned by their members, and their rights are exercised through the general 
member assembly. In order to control fund activities, the general member assembly elects a board 
of directors, which is in charge of management strategy decision-making, and a board of 
supervisors, which is responsible for the examination of financial statements and other auditing 
affairs. The daily operation of a fund is carried out by personnel belonging exclusively to that fund 
and by other employees, as required by law. Among these officers are a managing director, an 
auditor, an actuary, a legal officer, and an internal auditor. Moreover, outsourcing is permitted for a 
series of tasks, such as asset management, membership recruitment, administration, and record 
keeping. The expenses related to these outsourced operations are added up, respectively, in the 
following manner: asset management to investment spending expenditure; and, membership 
recruitment, administration, and record keeping to operational expenditure. 
 The PPFs and financial institutions involved in the management and control of fund assets are 
under FSA supervision. This state authority is in charge of a pension-fund license-approval 
procedure. In addition, the FSA conducts minute inspections of quarterly and annual reports, which 
each PPF is compelled to disclose by law. The FSA receives operational funds from the national 
budget, but, at the same time, receives supervisory fees from each PPF. Such fees function as a type 
of tax and are added up to the operational expenditure within the fixed expenditure of each fund.
11 
The amount, from 1998 to 2000, was 0.2 % of the member contribution, but it was raised to 0.35 % 
in 2001 and to 0.5 % in 2002. 
 
Governmental Decrees No. 171/1997 and No. 282/2001 on the Investment and Economic Activities 
Private Pension Funds; (3) Governmental Decree No. 172/1997 on Tasks Related to the Central 
Registration by Funds and the Data Supply Obligation of Funds and Employers Related to Funds 
Members; (4) Governmental Decree No. 173/1997 on the Specific Annual Reporting and 
Bookkeeping Liabilities of Private Pension Funds; (5) Governmental Decree No. 174/1997 on the 
Specific Annual Reporting and Bookkeeping Liabilities of the Guarantee Fund of the Funds; and (6) 
Governmental Decree No. 217/2000 and Governmental Decree No. 222/2000 on the Special Features 
of the Obligation to Prepare the Annual Report of the Cash Office Guarantee Fund and of its 
Accounting. 
11 The supervisory fee paid to the FSA in 2002 and 2003 was 8.0 % and 8.6 % of the total operating 
expenses, respectively (see Table 8). Obviously, this is no small amount by any means.  8
 The changes in pension insurance rates from 1998 to 2003 are as shown in Table 1. The 
insurance rate at the time of the new scheme’s introduction was 31 % for both the employer and 
employee combined. However, in order to sharply reduce the share from the employer, the 
insurance rate was decreased, and, as a result, the total rate as of 2003 was reduced to 26.5 %. On 
the other hand, the employee insurance rate went up by 1.5 % to 8.5 %. For instance, if an 
employee chooses the “mixed system,” in which contributions are made to both the PAYG scheme 
and the MPPS, 82 % (7 % of gross wages) of the contributions will go to the PPFs. At the time of 
the reform, Act LXXX of 1997 had forecast to keep the total insurance rate constant at 31 % and to 
increase the employee rate to 9 %, of which 89 % (8 % of gross wages) was to be allocated to the 
PPFs. However, in reality, the contribution that was paid to each fund was set at 6 % of gross wages 
for five years (1998-2002). These changes were obviously not welcomed by the funds. As we have 
emphasized in the previous section, it is considered that these details are a direct manifestation of 
the pension system being a political issue between the ruling and opposition parties scrambling 
fiercely for political power. 
   About 4 or 5 % of the member contribution covers operational costs, and another 1 % is 
appropriated for various contingency reserves. Therefore, the remaining 94 to 95 % is credited to 
the members’ individual accounts. The reason for the existence of the fund will be called into 
question as a pension payment institution unless it annually secures a real rate of return of at least 1 
to 2 % after deductions are made. The investment activity by PPFs is stipulated in detail by the laws 
and decrees cited above; namely, the Governmental Decree No. 171/1997 sets down strict 
guidelines for the financial products, which fund assets may be invested into, and the maximum 
asset ratio that may be invested. For example, out of the total assets, the PPFs and asset 
management companies commissioned by PPFs cannot invest more than 30 % in foreign 
government securities, 30 % in international financial institution bonds, 10 % in local government 
securities, 30 % in domestic rated A stocks, 20 % in domestic rated B and C stocks, and 10 % in 
real estate investment securities (FSA 2001, 34-35). Hungarian government securities are the only 
ones with no imposed limit. 
Table 2 indicates the portfolio structure evolution of MPPS assets. As it is clear at one glance, 
asset contents are fixed in general terms. That is, PPFs manage the majority of its assets on 
government securities, with the ratio averaging 75.9 % from 1998 to 2003. Meanwhile, the ratio of 
stocks and corporate bonds is 10.2 % and 2.6 %, respectively.
12 However, in Hungary, PPFs are 
considered to produce short-term profits in comparison to other institutional investors.
13 This 
 
12 Upon evaluating these facts, the FSA (2001, 18) expressed its opinion that, in reality, laws and 
governmental decrees hardly put a limit on investment activities of asset management companies. 
13 For instance, the distribution ratio of domestic stocks in the whole 2001 fourth-quarter portfolio for  9
opinion is mostly based on the facts that the political restrictions on insurance contributions had a 
negative effect on the funds and they influenced the policy governing asset management. 
For the most part, the annuity rate of the MPPS depends on the investment returns of the 
reserve period. However, Act LXXXII of 1997 established a safeguard by introducing the concept 
of guaranteed capital. That is, if the capital endowment of an eligible member is less than the 
minimum stipulated amount, that individual’s capital is brought up to the guaranteed level by a 
capital transfer from the Guarantee Fund. This applies only to those who have contributed to MPPS 
for more than 180 months (i.e., 15 years). In order to secure this measure, PPFs are obligated to 
contribute a portion of a member’s contributions (0.3 to 0.5 %) to the Guarantee Fund.
14  The rate is 
decided by the board of the Guarantee Fund and approved by the FSA. The assets built up in this 
manner must be managed through government securities. It is stipulated that, when funds are 
insufficient, the government will make up the difference. Needless to say, the existence of the 
Guarantee Fund accelerates the shift from the first pillar of the pension scheme to the second. At 
the same time, it increases the risk of inducing a moral hazard on citizens and PPFs. 
Keeping the above facts in mind, the fourth section will deal with the development process 
and the industrial organization of the mandatory private pension market. 
 
4. DEVELOPMENT AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION OF 
THE MANDATORY PRIVATE PENSION MARKET 
 
First, we will track down the development process of the mandatory private pension market.  
Figure 1 shows membership enrolment and asset values of the PPFs. At the time the new pension 
system was introduced, employees were given a grace period of 20 months (from January 1998 to 
August 1999) to choose whether to continue depending 100 % on the PAYG scheme after 1998 or 
to change to the mixed system. The government anticipated that about 1.5 million citizens would 
join the MPPS; however, in reality, 2.0 million people decided to join the mixed system. This figure 
accounts for 52 % of the then total number of employees (3.8 million people). As Figure 2 shows, 
462,000 people selected the mixed system right before the grace period ended. Since then, the 
number of members in MPPS continued to fluctuate slightly and reached 2.3 million by the end of 
2003, which accounts for 58.7 % of the total number of employees (3.9 million people). Meanwhile, 
the value of the fund assets continued to increase steadily, reaching 561.4 billion HUF in 2003, 
 
PPFs, VPFs, investment trust companies, and insurance companies was 11.6 %, 10.8 %, 6.9 %, and 
5.6 %, respectively (FSA 2002).     
14 As the supervisory fee, the portion of a member’s contributions paid to the Guarantee Fund is 
included in the operating costs of PPFs. According to Table 8, its portion within the operating 
expenses averaged 5.7 % in 2002 and 6.2 % in 2003.  10
which corresponds to 2.6 % of GDP. 
   The expansion of the mandatory private pension market, which is backed by legal enforcement, 
is remarkable in comparison to other social security markets. In other words, if we say that PPF 
membership and asset value increased from 1999 to 2003 by 957,000 people and 53.3 billion HUF, 
the same figures for the voluntary pension fund market only increased by 278,000 people and 33.3 
billion HUF, the health insurance fund market by 179,000 people and 1.3 billion HUF, and the 
income replacement fund market by 76,000 people and 130 million HUF.
15  As a result, in terms of 
the market value of assets, in 2002, PPFs surpassed VPFs, which had been active even before the 
implementation of the new pension system. In this way, the mandatory pension business grew to 
become the biggest industry in the social security sector. 
However, there is still a lot of room for development in the mandatory private pension market. 
The ground for this argument is the size of the pension fund market in comparison to the national 
economy and the age structure of fund members. That is, first of all, the ratio of the total gross asset 
values of PPFs and VPFs at the end of 2003 to GDP was only 4.9 %. In this regard, Hungary lags 
many European countries, which are led by Holland and Sweden (Figure 2). Second, the 
membership ratio of those in their late teens or twenties to the total membership was short of 
43.6 % even by the end of 2003, and the possibility of many more youths being lured to the 
mandatory private pension market has been pointed out (Augsztinovics et al. 2002, 70-71). Despite 
these circumstances, as indicated in Figure 1, total membership has been leveling off for the last 
few years, and, moreover, the number of citizens who go back to the old state PAYG social security 
pension system from the mixed system has been increasing rapidly year after year.
16 One of the 
reasons for this is that PPFs, which are private organizations, have not been able to provide 
sufficiently attractive financial services in comparison to the state-managed PAYG scheme.
17 
Hence, the focus should be turned on the industrial organization of the mandatory private pension 
market and the performance of funds. 
PPFs have been forming quite a concentrated market since the MPPS was introduced. The top 
six funds (OPT, ING, Aegon, Allianz, Credit Suisse, and Évgyűrűk) have always retained a share of 
 
15 Calculated by the authors based on FSA (2002; 2003a; 2004a). Moreover, the income replacement 
fund is a welfare fund whose main objectives are to support childbirth, to assist the purchase of 
medicines and medical tools, and to provide education.   
16 According to Párniczky (2003), only 1,594 members left the MPPS in 1998, but the number 
continued to increase, reaching 9,815 in 1999, 17,778 in 2000, and 52,233 in 2002. 
17 There is another possible reason: a large number of employees over a certain age, who should have 
stayed in the PAYG system on the basis of pure financial calculation, joined MPPS in time for the 
introduction of the new pension system because they lost faith in the PAYG, which had performed 
very badly in the early 1990s. Shortly afterwards, some of them, however, recognized that they would 
be better in the PAYG system than in the mixed system. 11
approximately 85 % of membership and 80 % of asset balance through 1998 to 2003. In fact, the 
Herfindahl index for the mandatory private pension market in 2003 reached 0.159 in member base 
and 0.16 in asset value base. Regarding the voluntary pension markets, the Herfindahl indices were 
0.075 and 0.060 respectively, which demonstrates how high the concentration rate of the mandatory 
private pension market really is.
18  During the same period, the FSA issued licenses to a total of 60 
organizations, 20 of which had to give up on their inauguration because they could not attract 2,000 
members,
19 the minimum membership required by law, and 22 other organizations made it to the 
inauguration but disappeared one after the other as they were being absorbed by large funds.
20 As  a 
result of intensive M&A activities, only 18 PPFs had survived by the end of 2003 (Table 3). Even 
today, small- and medium-sized funds are exposed to the danger of non-continuance due to severe 
market competition.
21 
As stated in the previous section, PPFs are legally owned by ordinary citizens with 
membership status in a fund whose representative body is the general member assembly as the 
highest decision-making body. However, it is not an exaggeration to say that, as in mutual 
corporations in developed countries, the real fund management is entirely in the hands of the 
founding body. In the case of Hungary, such bodies are classified into four categories: (1) banks, (2) 
insurance companies, (3) employers including the military and public corporations,
22 and  (4)  other 
mixed institutions.
23  The industrial organization of the mandatory private pension market by group 
is shown in Table 4. As of the end of 2003, the composition of the management body of all 18 
funds was distributed among five banks, five insurance companies, six direct employer 
management bodies, and two mixed institutions. As Table 4 shows, PPFs belonging to banks and 
insurance companies are in fact dominating the market. Of the six big funds mentioned above, the 
top five have banks and insurance companies as direct founding bodies. 
Fund organizations whose real management power is seized by banks and insurance 
 
18  Calculated by the authors based on statistics available at the FSA website. 
19 Conversely, the minimum membership of VPFs, whose legal regulations are less strict, is only 15 
members. 
20 According  to  Augsztinovics  et al. (2002, 68), members of almost all of the absorbed PPFs amounted 
to less than 10,000 people. 
21 In fact, researchers and specialists whom we interviewed in March, 2004 suggested that the exit of 
the funds from the market would continue even after joining the EU and, in a few years, the number 
of funds would decrease to between 10 and 15. 
22 For instance, the following is a list of funds and their founding bodies: Postás (postal service), 
Honvéd (military), DIMENZIÓ (telecommunication company), Vasutas (railway company), and 
Villamosenergia (electric power company). 
23 This category includes PPFs jointly established by employers, trade unions, and small- and 
medium-sized VPFs. Most of the PPFs culled out between 1998 and 2002 were mixed institutions.  12
companies have a remarkably strong survival capacity. That is, the ratio for currently active funds 
out of the sixty organizations is 24 % in case of direct management by employer and 11 % in case 
of mixed institutions, whereas that for PPFs whose main management body is either a bank or an 
insurance company is 59 %. 
Table 5 shows the average values and standard deviations for 2003 performance by 
management bodies. This data strongly suggests that PPFs belonging to banks and insurance 
companies gained many members by using their established reputation, as well as their powerful 
branches and networks. On the other hand, it is characteristic of funds established by employers to 
have a significantly high asset value per member, particularly when compared to PPFs in other 
categories. According to Augsztinovics et al. (2002, 70) and Párniczky (2003), the reason for this is 
that the income levels of members (namely, of employees at big corporations) are considerably 
higher than the average income in Hungary. In this sense, funds managed by employers have a 
predominance in terms of membership quality. 
As shown above, it has been confirmed that, after the introduction of the new pension system 
in 1998, the mandatory private pension market has developed rapidly, and the number of PPFs has 
considerably diminished. If the economic size of Hungary is considered, the market dominance of 
PPFs, whose real management power belongs to banks and insurance companies, is far from being 
tantamount to an oligopoly. Rather, the problem is a fund’s profitability, which will influence the 
future of MPPS. The following section investigates this point. 
 
5. PERFORMANCE OF PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS 
By focusing on 2003, the asset management performance of PPFs operated by banks and insurance 
companies is not too different from that of PPFs directly operated by the employers and is rather 
inferior to that of mixed institution funds (Table 5). However, assessments based on the 
performance of a single fiscal year are risky. Hence, we have tested whether differences in a 
management body have a statistically significant impact on the investment activities by estimating 
regression models of net rate of return on investments to total assets (PFTRAT) for each fiscal year 
from 1998 to 2003 to year dummies (99D, 00D, 01D, 02D, 03D) that control the market volatility 
in each year, management body dummies (BNK, ISR, EMP), and the individual effect of each fund. 
The results are shown in Table 6. The coefficients of all management body dummies in Model (A) 
have quite a low explanatory power with no statistical significance.
24  Models (B, C), which control 
the individual effects of each fund, also showed the same results. This evidence strongly suggests 
 
24 In addition, the interval estimation rejects at the 5 % level of significance the hypothesis that a 
difference in management body spells a 0.5 % difference in investment performance.  13
that the difference in management body does not have a significant influence on investment 
performance. However, even though the level of investment performance of PPFs belonging to 
banks and insurance companies is not higher, it is possible that this type of PPFs is superior in 
terms of asset management stability, because banks and insurance companies can enjoy 
scale-economy. Therefore, we estimated a regression model that takes the variance of the net rate of 
return to total assets (RFTVAR) in 1998-2003 as a dependent variable. The following is the result: 
 
PFTVAR = 32.873+12.776ŋBNK -2.931ŋISR -6.036ŋEMP   






 Moreover, we also estimated a model controlling the asset scale of each fund by adding the 
natural logarithm of the total asset value (TAV) by the end of 2003 to the explanatory variables: 
 
PFTVAR = -61.994+4.603ŋBNK -17.888ŋISR -4.607ŋEMP +6.293ŋln (TAV) 






These results suggest that it is highly possible that the differences in management body do not 
have a statistically significant impact even from the viewpoint of asset management stability. This 
empirical evidence confirms that having a bank or an insurance company as the fund’s operational 
body does not amount to any sort of a substantial plus factor, at least not in regard to the investment 
activities of PPFs. 
Here, an interesting question has surfaced, and it is how to interpret the fact that there is no 
significant economic or statistical gap in terms of the level and stability of investment performance 
between powerful funds operated by banks and insurance companies, including foreign-owned 
financial institutions with abundant investment experience and the remaining small and 
medium-sized funds. Augsztinovics et al. (2002, 76-80) approached this point by comparing the 
investment performance in 2000 between the two groups of funds. The first group is PPFs that 
chose asset managers in a competitive market, and the second group is PPFs, in which the asset 
manager is an insider from the interest group of the founding bank or insurance company. As a 
result, they point out the following two points: (1) although there is hardly any gap in terms of 
gross investment returns (7.7 % to 7.4 %), the net returns
25 displays a considerable gap favorable 
to the first group (7.1 % to 5.9 %); (2) the asset management costs of the second group are 
considerably higher than those of the first group in terms of total asset value (0.6 % to 1.5 %) and 
gross investment returns (8.5 % to 23.8 %). 
 
25  It is a residual value after subtracting expenses on asset management from gross investment returns.  14
The credibility of the first point is somewhat questionable in the sense that their analysis was 
based on data from a single year and may not consider the variance of the investment return ratio 
within the groups. In addition, this point is not consistent with the results of regression analysis 
conducted by the authors. On the other hand, the second point on management costs shows an 
extremely significant difference between the two groups, which is noteworthy as a perspective in 
the investigation of this issue. In fact, Párniczky (2003) also mentions the relative superiority in 
terms of the management costs of funds directly managed by employers over the ones belonging to 
banks and insurance companies. As stated in the third section, PPFs have the sanction of law to 
outsource asset management, membership recruitment, administration, and record keeping. 
Actually, funds belonging to very large financial groups outsource almost all these affairs to their 
group companies; thus, it is commonplace to see funds operated by a few individuals. Consequently, 
as it is clear from the data on investment returns and the operating expense structure of PFFs, 
shown in Tables 7 and 8, the outsourcing fees paid to affiliated companies are large enough to 
affect the final business outcome of the fund. Moreover, these ratios tend to increase annually. 
Management activities of PPFs are not likely to be monitored effectively by members because 
their ownership is broadly dispersed. Especially, larger funds, such as those operated by banks and 
insurance companies, have a greater tendency to be unsupervised. In addition, when an outsourcing 
company belongs to the same corporate group, it is extremely difficult to motivate the staff 
members of funds to reduce fees paid to affiliated companies. Therefore, fund assets may be used 
to pay outsourcing fees to recoup initial investments, unless the government or the FSA considers it 
a crucial problem or pension members “exit” all together.
 26 
So far, hampered by a lack of information disclosure, the facts of outsourcing activities by 
PPFs have hardly been brought to light. However, data released specially by the FSA for this 
research strongly suggests the high cost of funds operated by banks and insurance companies 
(Table 9). Such tendencies are especially apparent when investment expenditures are considered as 
a part of the total assets. Moreover, the relative superiority of funds belonging to banks and 
insurance companies over funds managed by employers directly and of mixed institutions cannot 
be found in other indices either. We surmise that these facts are reflections of the relatively high 
asset management and administration costs, a large part of which corresponds to outsourcing fees, 




26 In fact, according to a Hungarian researcher we interviewed in March 2004, an executive at a big 
pension fund honestly admitted at a conference that he was controlling the rate of outsourcing fees at 
his discretion for early recoup of initial investments.  15
Empirical results and facts reported in the previous section indicate the emergence of an “agency 
problem” (Jensen 2000) in management activities of bank/insurance company-affiliated private 
pension funds. If this were the case, it would be possible to overlook such problems in cases in 
which PPFs have enough investment returns to provide sufficient future benefits to members when 
taking management body incentives into consideration. However, according to FSA estimations, 
the annual real rate of return on investments for PPFs from 1998 to 2000 surpassed the real wage 
increase for the same period by only 0.73 %. International experience shows that the real rate of 
return for a private pension fund normally surpasses the real wage increase rate by at least 1.5 % 
(FSA 2001, 22). Regrettably, Figure 3 demonstrates that it is highly probable that asset 
management performance of the surviving 18 funds throughout the 2001-2003 period is even lower 
than that for the three years following the pension reform.
27 That is to say, currently, since the 
establishment of PPFs, lower asset management performance in comparison to international 
standards has become common. In order for the MPPS to be sustainable in the future, corporate 
governance reform and reinforcement of the monitoring system are required. This is also an 
important policy issue determining whether or not the pension reform executed by the Hungarian 
government in 1998 will succeed. Nevertheless, this is not the only problem. To begin with, the 
management behaviors of PPFs largely result from the political instability of the pension system 
itself. Freeing MPS operations from political conflict contributes significantly to the management 
of PPFs as well as to their efficiency and transparency. From this point of view, the EU accession in 
May, 2004 provides an important opportunity for the MPPS to become more sophisticated as an 
institutional and to seek political neutrality. As Müller (2004, 17) stated, there is no universal and 
optimal pension model in Western Europe that is simply applicable to the new EU members. This 
does not exclude, however, the possibility that the Hungarian government can improve the second 
pillar by borrowing institutional designs and regulations of pension funds from Western experience. 
In additon, if the Hungarian people are familiar with the actual circumstances of the old members 
and clearly recognize the necessity to manage their own social security system from long-term 
perspectives, they must be more critical of their politicians, who regard the pension system as a tool 
for power over their opposition. Needless to say, economic integration into the EU may have a 
positive impact on the management discipline of PPFs and their backup bodies by promoting 
market competition in the Hungarian market. We are hopeful that the Hungarian government and its 
citizens will make the best possible decisions in this regard. 
 
27 Moreover, according to the assesment provided by specialists interviewed in March, 2004, the 
worsening of the investment return rate in the last few years is largely due to three factors: (1) a 
domestic stock market slump; (2) a fall in long-term government securities yields; and (3) an inflation 
rate decline.  16
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1998 24.0 7.0 31.0 1.0 6.0
1999 22.0 8.0 30.0 2.0 6.0
2000 22.0 8.0 30.0 2.0 6.0
2001 20.0 8.0 28.0 2.0 6.0
2002 18.0 8.0 26.0 2.0 6.0
2003 18.0 8.5 26.5 1.5 7.0



















28.8 100.0 89.8 100.0 175.7 100.0 283.0 100.0 413.1 100.0 564.6 100.0
3.1 10.76 2.5 2.78 2.3 1.31 3.0 1.06 13.7 3.32 3.8 0.7
1.0 3.47 0.3 0.33 0.1 0.06 0.1 0.04 2.9 0.71 2.1 0.4
22.1 76.74 74.9 83.41 136.3 77.58 226.5 80.04 280.9 68.01 394.5 69.9
1.9 6.60 8.8 9.80 26.0 14.80 32.9 11.63 36.8 8.90 52.3 9.3
0.5 1.74 1.5 1.67 4.1 2.33 8.4 2.97 17.2 4.16 16.8 3.0
0.1 0.35 1.5 1.67 4.6 2.62 6.6 2.33 29.3 7.08 40.6 7.2
0.1 0.35 0.3 0.33 2.3 1.31 5.5 1.94 32.3 7.81 54.5 9.6
Source: Authors' calculation based on FSA (2004a).
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2000 2003 2002 1999 2001
Table 1. Pension Insurance Contribution Rates, 1998-2003
Insurance rate for
employees who chose
mixed system Employer Employee Total
Table 2. Portfolio Composition of the Private Pension Funds, 1998-2003
1998
Total asset value






Corporate and municipal bonds        Source: Authors' illustration based on FSA (2003b; 2004b).
Note: Hungary, as of the end of 2003; the rest, as of June, 2001 (including EU Pension Fund and domestic private and voluntary pension funds).
Source: Authors' illustration based on FSA (2001; 2004a).
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 19OTP 607,280 101,141,309 166.55 3.94 B OTP Alapkezelő Rt.
ING 366,980 77,300,880 210.64 3.92 I ING Investment Management Rt.
AEGON 362,727 67,287,600 185.50 1.31 I AEGON Mo. Alapkezelő Rt.
Allianz 272,779 41,521,397 152.22 3.60 I Allianz Hungária Biztosító Rt.
Credit Suisse 202,158 40,719,000 201.42 2.77 I Credit Suisse Life & Pensions Biztosító Rt.
Évgyűrűk 105,452 16,295,933 154.53 4.37 M
Postabank Értékpapírforgal-mazási és Befeketési
Rt., Erste Bank Alapkezelő Rt., Generali
Alapkezelő Rt.
Aranykor 80,267 15,546,968 193.69 0.59 B K&H Értékpapír Befektetési Alapkezelő Rt.
UNIQA 56,993 8,951,123 157.06 2.78 I UNIQA Vagyonkezelő Rt.
Budapest 34,988 9,598,934 274.35 2.23 B Budapest Alapkezelő Rt.
Erste Bank 21,768 3,466,563 159.25 1.46 B Erste Bank Alapkezelő Rt.
MKB 20,262 6,861,117 338.62 2.78 B MKB Rt.
Postás 20,185 5,146,558 254.97 0.68 E
MKB Rt., Erste Bank Alapkezelő Rt., CA-IB Ért
ékpapír Befektetési Alapkezelő Rt., Raiffeisen
Alapkezelő Rt.
Honvéd 15,506 7,751,328 499.89 2.95 E
MKB Rt., Erste Bank Alapkezelő Rt., Generali
Alapkezelő Rt.
DIMENZIÓ 12,407 4,930,617 397.41 4.83 E
Concorde Befektetési Alapkezelő Rt., CA-IB Ért
ékpapír Befektetési Alapkezelő Rt., MKB Rt.
Quaestor 9,572 351,804 36.75 n/a E Quaestor Értékpapír Rt.
Vasutas 8,381 2,273,896 271.32 2.30 E CIB Értékpapír Rt., Erste Bank Befektetési Rt.
Villamosenergia 7,757 3,119,901 402.20 1.56 E Managed by the same company
Életút Első 2,700 761,871 282.17 3.80 M
Concorde Befektetési Alapkezelő Rt., MKB Rt.,
Magyar Takarékszövetkezeti Bank Rt., CIB
Befektetési Alapkezelő Rt.
Source: Compiled by the authors based on FSA official data.
* B: banks; I: insurance companies; E: employer directly; M: mixed institution.











































Bank 7655 0.74 33.8 0.79 35.1 0.76 34.1 0.8 35.3 56.8 32.3 97.0 34.3 136.1 32.9 191.5 34.1
Insurance Company 5555 1.22 55.5 1.27 56.4 1.28 57.4 1.3 56.7 97.0 55.2 156.4 55.2 235.1 56.9 316.4 56.4
Employer 8756 0.07 3.4 0.07 3.1 0.07 3.1 0.1 3.3 12.1 6.9 17.6 6.2 24.8 6.0 30.7 5.5
Mixed 5432 0.16 7.3 0.13 5.8 0.12 5.4 0.1 4.7 9.7 5.5 12.1 4.3 17.3 4.2 22.8 4.1
Total 25 22 18 18 2.19 100.0 2.25 100.0 2.23 100.0 2.3 100.0 175.6 100.0 283.1 100.0 413.1 100.0 561.4 100.0
Source: Compiled by the authors based on FSA data (2001; 2002; 2003a) and data provided to the authors by the FSA.
2003
Asset value (Billion HUF)
2000
Number of Funds
2000 2001 2002 2003
2
1
2002 2001 Management body 2001 2002 2000 2003
Membership (Millions)











All funds 122.68 22.95 241.03 2.70
(172.08) (30.20) (112.48) (1.28)
Bank 152.91 27.32 226.49 2.20
(255.16) (41.50) (77.55) (1.28)
Insurance company 252.33 47.16 181.37 2.88
(128.86) (26.68) (26.06) (1.01)
Employer 12.30 3.93 310.42 2.46
(4.81) (2.58) (162.10) (1.57)
Mixed 54.08 8.53 218.35 4.09
(72.66) (10.98) (90.26) (0.40)
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
Source: Authors' calcuration based on Table 3.
     (a) In nominal term (%)             (b) In real term (%)
Table 5. Comparison of 18 Private Pension Fund Performances in 2003 by the
Management Body
Figure 3. Distribution of Net Profit Rate to Total Assets of 18 Private Pension Funds, 1998-2003
Note: The box portion represents the first and third quartiles (middle 50 percent of the data). The mean is drawn using * in
the box with its actual value, while the median is depicted using a line through the center of the box. The ⿞ and * outside the
box indicate near and far outliers respectively. The shaded region displays approximate confidence intervals for the median.
Source: Authors' illustration based on FSA official data (in nominal terms) and Dr. Ágnes Matits's estimation (Matits,























































BNK -0.035 - -
(-0.05) - -
ISR -1.193 - -
(-1.52) - -
EMP 0.030 - -
(0.04) - -
Individual Effects
OTP - -0.302 -0.046
ING - -2.777 -0.421
AEGON - -1.540 -0.233
Allianz - 1.481 0.224
Credit Suisse - -0.709 -0.107
Évgyűrűk - -0.910 -0.138
Aranykor - 0.211 0.032
UNIQA - -0.778 -0.082
Budapest - -0.424 -0.064
Erste Bank - 1.221 0.185
MKB - 0.725 0.110
Postás - 1.106 0.167
Honvéd - 0.603 0.091
DIMENZIÓ - 0.150 0.023
Quaestor - 1.341 0.140
Vasutas - -0.260 -0.039
Villamosenergia - 0.160 0.024
Életút Első - 0.888 0.134
Means of Individual Effects -
Bank-affiliated - 0.286 0.043
Insurance company-affiliated - -0.864 -0.124
Direct management by employers - 0.352 0.053
Mixed institutions - 0.439 0.046
N (unbalanced) 104 104 104
R
2 0.812 0.841 0.807
Adjusted R










Note: 99D, 00D, 01D, 02D, 3D : Annual dummies; BNK: Bank dummy; ISR: Insurance company
dummy; EMP: Employer dummy. t-statistics are given in parentheses. * Significant at the 1%
p=0.929














Investment revenue 31,544 100.0 30,602 100.0 45,709 100.0 26,314 100.0
Interest revenue 19,376 61.4 17,497 57.2 24,041 52.6 17,288 65.7
Latent returns from securities (unrealized capital gain) 10,599 33.6 10,420 34.1 17,519 38.3 5,448 20.7
Gain on sales of investments 0 0.0 149 0.5 698 1.5 2,814 10.7
Return from dividends 261 0.8 327 1.1 503 1.1 655 2.5
Returns on other financial transactions 1,308 4.1 2,208 7.2 2,947 6.4 109 0.4
Returns from real estate management investments 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Investment expenditure 23,470 100.0 14,615 100.0 23,400 100.0 16,260 100.0
Interest repayment 8,256 35.2 39 0.3 1 0.0 981 6.0
Latent loss from securities (unrealized capital loss) 6,345 27.0 1,937 13.3 5,106 21.8 9,018 55.5
Loss from sales of investment 0 0.0 121 0.8 503 2.2 1,146 7.1
Loss from financial transactions 8,894 13,567 16,821 -








Expenditures on other financial transactions 0 0.0 34 0.2 -120 -0.5 7 0.0
Expenditures on real estate investment acquisitions 4 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Outsourcing fee for asset management affairs 1,562 6.7 2,594 17.7 3,520 15.0 4,970 30.6
Expenditures on other investment activities 1,220 5.2 2,196 15.0 3,005 12.8 138 0.8


















Material expeditures 195 3.6 61 0.9 45 0.6 52 0.6
Wages and public contributions of fund
employees 400 7.4 465 6.9 583 8.2 731 7.8
Compensation and public contribution of
fund offficers 132 2.4 112 1.7 102 1.4 130 1.4
Membership recruitment 330 6.1 339 5.1 270 3.8 312 3.3
Administration/record keeping outsource
fee 2,777 51.2 3,645 54.3 4,330 61.0 5,619 60.3
Auditing fee 34 0.6 54 0.8 53 0.7 54 0.6
Actuarial fee 12 0.2 19 0.3 29 0.4 33 0.4
Consulting fee 62 1.1 23 0.3 62 0.9 51 0.5
Marketing and advertisement 23 0.4 31 0.5 97 1.4 191 2.1
FSA supervisory fee 164 3.0 341 5.1 571 8.0 803 8.6
Guarantee Fund contribution fee 331 6.1 400 6.0 402 5.7 574 6.2
Others 968 17.8 1,222 18.2 560 7.9 769 8.2
Total 5,428 100.0 6,712 100.0 7,103 100.0 9,320 100.0
Source: FSA (2004a).
Table 8. Operating Expenditure of Private Pension Funds, 2000-2003




















Bank 14,391 18,834.9 105.7 11,067 13,604.6 57.8
Insurance company 27,334 21,293.5 116.3 12,929 9,893.1 40.9
&mployer 2,071 31,733.8 83.4 1,102 14,511.3 35.9
Mixed 1,724 14,631.6 99.6 1,215 11,201.5 53.2
All funds 45,520 20,405.0 110.2 26,314 11,416.8 46.9
Investment expenditure
Bank 6,967 9,117.7 51.2 6,588 8,098.1 34.4
Insurance company 14,999 11,684.2 63.8 8,797 6,731.2 27.8
&mployer 689 10,565.2 27.8 473 6,232.4 15.4
Mixed 661 5,609.5 38.2 402 3,704.1 17.6
All funds 23,316 10,451.7 56.4 16,260 7,054.8 29.0
Investment revenue (net)
Bank 7,425 9,717.2 54.6 4,479 5,506.5 23.4
Insurance company 12,335 9,609.2 52.5 4,132 3,161.8 13.1
&mployer 1,381 21,168.6 55.6 629 8,278.9 20.5
Mixed 1,063 9,022.1 61.4 813 7,497.3 35.6
All funds 22,204 9,953.3 53.8 10,054 4,362.0 17.9
Operating expenditure
Bank 2,389 3,126.9 17.6 3,169 3,895.8 16.5
Insurance company 3,988 3,107.0 17.0 5,281 4,040.7 16.7
&mployer 378 5,796.0 15.2 428 5,629.3 13.9
Mixed 360 3,054.6 20.8 442 4,075.0 19.3
All funds 7,116 3,189.7 17.2 9,320 4,043.5 16.6
Source: Authors' calculation based on data provided to the authors by the FSA.
Management Body
2002 2003
Table 9. Comparison of Investment Revenue, Investment Expenditure, and Operating Expenditure
of Private Pension Funds by Management Body, 2002-2003
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